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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH OPHEIKENS, and 
FANNY OPHEIKENS, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants 
vs. 
ARTHUR C. SHERON and 
BARBARA O. SHERON, : 
Defendants/Respondents. 
: Case No. 880276 
: Priority No. 14(b). 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred 
upon the Supreme Court of Utah, pursuant to Rule 3(a) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, and § 78-2-2 (3)(f) of the Utah 
Code Annotated 1988. This is an appeal from a final judgement of 
the Second Judicial District Court over which the Court of 
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final order of the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, rendered by the Honorable David 
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E. Roth sitting without a jury. The trial court awarded the 
Plaintiffs a life estate in their home and granted the Defendants 
a remainder interest therein. Plaintiffs are appealing the 
judgement. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiffs are appealing the judgement of the district 
court citing the following grounds for appeal: 
1. That the trial court, after imposing a constructive trust, 
abused its discretion by awarding a remainder interest in the 
property to the Defendants. 
2. That the trial court abused its discretion by awarding a 
remainder interest to the Defendants because the plaintiffs did 
not request that they be granted a remainder interest in their 
pleadings. 
3. That the Defendants presented insufficient evidence at trial 
to justify the trial court's finding that they had equity in the 
property sufficient to purchase a remainder interest therein. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On December 7, 1967, Joseph Opheikens and his wife Fannie, 
signed a quit-claim deed to their home and real property located 
at 141 Jefferson Avenue, consisting of Lots 14 and 15, Block 2, 
Cropseys, addition to Ogden City, Utah, to their daughter and 
son-in-law, Barbara 0. and Arthur C. Sheron as joint tenants. 
(Exhibit D-l). 
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Plaintiffs allege that the quit-claim deed was to secure 
payment on $1,028.00 loaned by the Sherons to the Opheikens loan 
to pay delinquent property taxes on the Opheiken's home. Record 
at 252. The Defendants contend that at the time the quit-claim 
deed was signed, the Opheikens intended to transfer ownership of 
their home to the Sherons permanently rather than have the home 
lost through foreclosure. Record at 372. 
The following brief history of the home and who contributed 
to its construction is helpful in presenting a background of the 
circumstances leading to this action. The Opheiken's home was 
built on land they purchased in 1932 for $500.00. Record at 231. 
In the early 1950's the Opheikens borrowed $2,150.00 from Mr. and 
Mrs. William Holt to finance the construction of a new home on 
their land. Record at 233. The $2,150.00 was not sufficient to 
complete the construction so the Opheikens borrowed $4,500.00 
from Froerer Realty to complete the house. Record at 239. 
In addition to the $4,500.00, Mrs. Opheikens testified that she 
borrowed another $700.00 from Froerer for their kitchen cabinets. 
Record at 239. 
Arthur Sheron testified that he loaned the Opheikens $700.00 
in approximately 1957, and that he borrowed the Money from 
Beneficial Finance to loan to the Opheikens. Mr. Sheron stated 
that he did not know what the Opheikens intended to do with the 
$700.00. Record at 364. Upon cross-examination, Mrs. Opheikens 
testified that the $700.00 that Mr. Sheron borrowed from 
Beneficial Finance was used to purchase a 1955 Chevrolet, and 
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that the Opheikens never borrowed $700.00 from the Sherons. 
Record at 280. 
At trial the Defendants testified that they have made 
substantial contributions to the construction of the Opheiken's 
home, in addition to the $1,028.00 which they gave to the 
Opheikens to pay the back taxes in 1967. 
Fannie Opheikens testified at trial that her daughter, 
Defendant Barbara Sheron, gave the Plaintiffs $600.00 to help 
build the house. Fannie stated that of the $600.00 that Barbara 
contributed, $200.00 was used to dig the foundation for the 
house, and $400.00 was used to purchase lumber. Record at 234. 
Fannie testified that Barbara did not contribute any more than 
$600.00 toward the construction of the home. Id. 
Barbara Sheron testified that she contributed all of the 
$1,900.00 insurance settlement which she received from the death 
of her first husband. Record at 316. However, the only evidence 
of any contribution made by Barbara Sheron to the initial 
construction of the house was a check for approximately $400.00 
to Hurst Lumber. Record at 336, and Exhibit P-14. 
During the construction of the home, the Defendant, Barbara 
Sheron, was one of three children living with the Opheikens after 
being recently widowed when Jack Griven, her husband of a short 
time, died in an automobile accident. Barbara received an 
insurance settlement of $1900.00 from her husband's death in 
addition to $10,000.00 which she received from his life insurance 
policy. For ten years, Barbara received a monthly check of 
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$92,90 from her husband's life insurance policy, and $19.00 per 
month as Social Security benefits. While living with her 
parents, Barbara gave her parents $100.00 per month from her 
income. 
After living with her parents for approximately one year, 
Barbara married Arthur Sheron. Barbara and her second husband 
Arthur Sheron lived with the Opheikens for approximately three 
months prior to moving into their own home on Second Street in 
Ogden. Mrs. Opheikens testified at trial that Barbara and Arthur 
Sheron used the insurance money to make the payments on their 
house on Second Street. Record at 238. 
At the time the quit-claim deed was signed in 1967, the 
Opheikens had been making mortgage payments on their home since 
approximately 1950. Mrs. Opheikens testified at trial that at 
the time the quit-claim deed was signed, the Opheikens had no 
intention of transferring their interest in the property to the 
Sherons. Record at 260. After the quit-claim deed was signed, 
the Opheikens continued to make each and every payment on the 
mortgage, taxes, utilities, insurance and any other assessments 
until the final payment of $286.34 was made on June 31, 1977. 
Record at 243. 
The Opheikens testified that since the quit-claim deed was 
signed they have made repeated offers to repay the $1,028.00 to 
the Sherons. However, according to the testimony of Mrs. 
Opheikens, the Sheron's have refused to accept any money and have 
refused to return the quit-claim deed. Record at 244-45, 251-
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52, 253. 
Until approximately 1984, the Opheikens were unaware that 
the Sherons claimed to own their property. In about 1984, 
according to the testimony of Mrs. Opheikens, she realized that 
the Sherons were not going to willingly return the quit-claim 
deed. Record at 251, 253, 309-10. When the Opheikens learned 
that the Sherons intended to keep their home, they brought this 
action. 
At trial, the Sherons claimed to be the owners of the 
property in fee simple pursuant to the quit-claim deed, and 
that the Opheikens relinquished all right to ownership of their 
home. The Sherons's contend that they have allowed the Opheikens 
to live in the home as a gesture of kindness, even though the 
Opheikens have paid all taxes, mortgage payments, insurance, 
utilities, property assessments, and have maintained the 
property. Record at 3 72. 
The Sheron's claimed, in addition to the money loaned for 
back taxes and the money used during the construction of the 
home, that they have done yard work, snow removal, lawn care, and 
other odd jobs on the Opheikens property, for which they should 
be reimbursed. The Opheikens contended that the Sherons were not 
entitled to be reimbursed for their help around the house because 
the help was offered gratuitously at the time. The trial court 
concurred. Record at 472. At no time have the Sherons paid the 
Opheikens any consideration approximating a reasonable purchase 
price for the property. 
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This action was brought by the Opheikens against the Sherons 
for breaching a fiduciary relationship. At trial, the Opheikens 
asked the court to impose a constructive trust thereby returning 
the property to the Opheikens. In its decision, the trial court 
imposed a constructive trust. The trial court also ruled that 
Barbara and Arthur Sheron had contributed a total of $3628.00 
which included; (1) the $1028.00 used to pay the delinquent 
taxes, (2) $1,900.00 allegedly given to the Opheikens by Barbara 
Sheron while she was living with her parents during the 
construction of the home, and, (3) $700.00 given to the Opheikens 
by Arthur Sheron. Record at 472. 
The trial court went on to hold that the $3628.00 was 
sufficient to purchase a remainder interest in the property on 
behalf of the Sherons with a life estate for the Opheikens. 
Plaintiffs brought this appeal on the grounds that; (1) the 
trial court improperly awarded a remainder interest to the 
Defendants where the Defendants did not request a reminder 
interest be applied in their pleadings, and (2) that Defendants 
failed to present sufficient evidence as to the amount of money 
contributed toward the property which was used as a basis for 
awarding the remainder interest, and, (3) that there was not 
sufficient evidence presented as to the value of the house to 
establish whether the contribution of the Defendants was 
sufficient to purchase a remainder interest in the property. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court abused its discretion 
by imposing a remainder interest on the property which was 
returned to the Plaintiffs through a constructive trust. By 
imposing a remainder interest the court effectively nullified any 
effect the constructive trust had on the parties transaction. 
Plaintiffs further contend that because the Defendants did not 
request in their pleadings that they be awarded a remainder 
interest in the propertyf that the court acted outside the scope 
of its authority by granting such relief. Finally, Plaintiffs 
argue that insufficient evidence was presented by the Defendants 
to justify the trial court's award of a $3,628.00 interest in the 
property. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF A REMAINDER INTEREST 
IN THE PROPERTY TO THE DEFENDANTS IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH THE IMPOSITION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST FOR 
THE BENEFIT OF THE PLAINTIFFS. 
A constructive trust is defined by Blacks Law Dictionary, as 
The construct ive t r u s t i s a t r u s t raised by 
construction of law, or a r i s ing by operation 
of law, as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from an express 
t r u s t . Where t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s of a 
t r a n s a c t i o n a re such t h a t the person who 
takes a legal e s t a t e in property cannot also 
e n j o y t h e b e n e f i c i a l i n t e r e s t w i t h o u t 
n e c e s s a r i l y v i o l a t i n g some e s t a b l i s h e d 
p r i n c i p a l of e q u i t y , t h e c o u r t w i l l 
immediately ra i se a constructive t r u s t , and 
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fasten it upon the conscience of the legal 
owner, so as to convert him into a trustee 
for the parties who in equity are entitled to 
the beneficial enjoyment. 
Constructive trusts do not arise by agreement or 
from intention, but by operation of law, and 
fraud, active or constructive, is their essential 
element, actual fraud is not necessary, but such a 
trust will arise whenever circumstances under 
which property was acquired made it inequitable 
that it should be retained by him who holds the 
legal title. Constructive trusts have been said 
to arise through the application of equitable 
estoppel, or under the broad doctrine that equity 
regards and treats as done what in good conscience 
ought to be done, and such trusts are also known 
as 'trusts ex maleficio' or 'ex delicto' or 
'involuntary trusts' and their forms and varieties 
are practically without limit being raised by 
courts of equity whenever it becomes necessary to 
prevent a failure of justice." Blacks Law 
Dictionary, 1353 (5th Ed. 1979). 
The very definition of the doctrine of a constructive trust 
reveals the misapplication of the doctrine in the present case, 
the above definition states that, 
Where the circumstances of a transaction are such that 
the person who takes a legal estate in property cannot 
also enjoy the beneficial interest without necessarily 
violating some established principal of equity, the 
court will immediately raise a constructive trust, and 
fasten it upon the conscience of the legal owner, so as 
to convert him into a trustee for the parties who in 
equity are entitled to the beneficial enjoyment. 
Id., emphasis added. 
The trial court in this case, after holding that a 
constructive trust was applicable, effectively removed any 
equitable relief the trust may have had on the transaction by 
granting the Defendants a remainder interest in the Opheikens 
property. 
Once a constructive trust has been imposed, the legal owner 
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under the quit-claim deed becomes a "trustee for the parties who 
in equity are entitled to the beneficial enjoyment." Id. In 
this case, the Sherons became the trustees for the Opheikens when 
the trial court determined that the Plaintiffs had met the burden 
of imposing a constructive trust. When it was determined that 
the Opheikens owed the Sherons for the money contributed to the 
construction of the home, and for the money loaned to pay the 
back taxes, then the Opheikens should have been ordered to repay 
the Sherons, with a lien in the property as security. 
Although the trial court has some amount of discretion in 
forming an equitable remedy, by imposing a constructive trust, it 
confined itself to a specific form of relief. The effect of a 
constructive trust is clear; to return ownership to the grantors. 
By converting the Sherons from owners to trustees for the benefit 
of the Opheikens, the court may not in equity then allow the 
trustee to retain that which he has been entrusted to hold for 
the other's benefit. 
In Professor George Gleason Bogert's Handbook of the Law of 
Trusts, 303 West Publishing, 5th ed. (1973), the author states 
that, 
If the grantee was in a confidential or fiduciary 
relation with the grantor at the time of the deed 
and the oral promise to hold in trust, the grantee 
is usually made a constructive trustee for the intended 
beneficiary of the oral trust on account of the wrong 
involved in the violation of the relationship by 
repudiation of the promise. 
Professor Bogert illustrated the principle above with the 
following example: 
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In England and a few American states it is held that 
after the oral trustee has refused to carry out his 
trust in reliance on the Statute of Frauds, if he 
retains the property for himself he will be attempting 
to enrich himself unjustly and to perpetrate a wrong on 
the intended beneficiary and that he ought to be 
charged as a constructive trustee for the intended 
beneficiary, whether it be the grantor or a third 
person. Id., at 305, citations omitted. 
Professor Bogert further clarifies the effect of the 
imposition a constructive trust: 
The constructive trust would be a mere passive trust, 
on the basis of which equity would decree a 
reconveyance of the property to the settlor. It 
would require a grantee pleading voidability of his 
oral promise to hold in trust to return the 
consideration which he received for making such a 
promise"] It would require him to restore the grantor 
to his "former position,...1 Id., emphasis addecT 
Clearly, the imposition of a constructive trust has the 
effect of a "reconveyance" of the property and to "restore the 
grantor to his former position." 
In the present case the trial court, by granting a remainder 
interest to the Sherons has not made a clean "reconveyance" or 
"restore" the Opheikens to their "former position." The 
Opheikens former position was that of title in fee simple subject 
to a mortgage. After the trial court's ruling the Opheikens 
became life tenants with a remainder interest going to the 
Sherons. 
In order to find that a constructive trust is an appropriate 
remedy, the trial court must find among other things that: 
1 . The Plaintiffs must have an equitable interest in the 
property. Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 600 
(Utah 1983) . 
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2. That there will be unjust enrichment if the constructive 
trust is not imposed Parks v. Zions First National Bank, 673 P.2d 
590, 600 (Utah 1983) . 
To hold on one hand that the Opheikens have an "equitable 
interest" in the property, and that the element of "unjust 
enrichment" is present, and then to hold that the Defendants are 
entitled to a remainder interest in the property is inconsistent 
with doctrine of constructive trusts. 
The trial court found that there was insufficient 
consideration to purchase the property pursuant to the quit-claim 
deed, and to do so would unjustly enrich the Defendants. 
Therefore, the trial court imposed a constructive trust. To hold 
that unjust enrichment mandates the imposition of a constructive 
trust, then to allow the Defendants to keep the property would be 
contradictory. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY AWARDING 
A REMAINDER INTEREST TO THE DEFENDANTS WHERE SUCH 
RELIEF WAS NOT REQUESTED IN THE PLEADINGS. 
At no point in the pleadings did the Defendants claim that 
they held a remainder interest in the property, or that they 
should be made remaindermen. The trial court, in an effort to 
compensate the Sherons for the money loaned to the Opheikens, 
removed any hope the Opheikens may have had of having their home 
back, even if they paid the Defendants all monies to which they 
are entitled. 
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Because the issue of a remainder was never raised in the 
pleadings by either party, the Plaintiffs were not prepared to 
argue at trial that there was or was not sufficient money 
transacted to purchase a remainder interest in the property. 
There are numerous cases standing for the proposition that 
a trial court is not authorized to grant relief on issues neither 
raised in the pleadings nor tried. See, Cornia v. Cornia, 546 
P.2d 890, 893 (Utah 1976); Alley v. Peeso, 290 P. 238, 241-42 
(Oregon 1930); See also, Strout v. Burgess, 68 A.2d 241, 12 
A.L.R. 939. 
Clearly this case has some findings that are at variance 
with the claims of both parties, and where such is the case, the 
findings will be carefully scrutinized on review. See, West v. 
West, 403 P.2d 22, 25 (Utah 1965). 
Although the trial court in forming an equitable remedy is 
allowed considerable discretion, to attach a remainder interest 
for the benefit of the Defendants, removes the possibility the 
Plaintiffs may have had to repay the money which they owe to the 
Defendants and have clear title to their home. 
Where the issue of a remainder interest was not raised in 
the pleadings, or during the trial, both parties were unprepared 
to put on evidence as to the value of the property for such a 
purpose. 
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POINT III 
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT FINDS THAT THE TRIAL 
COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION IN ALLOWING 
A REMAINDER INTEREST TO FOLLOW THE IMPOSITION 
OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, PLAINTIFFS ALLEGE THAT 
THE EVIDENCE AS TO THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY, 
AND THE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE DEFENDANTS 
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AWARD OF A REMAINDER INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY. 
At trial no evidence was put on by either of the parties as 
to the approximate value of the property in dispute. For the 
trial court to find that the $3,628.00 was sufficient to purchase 
a remainder interest in the property, which the trial court 
estimated to be worth $15,000.00, is without a foundation. 
The home is worth much more that $15,000.00 by today's 
prices, and was worth more that $15,000.00 in 1967 as stated by 
the Defendant Barbara Sheron who believed the house and property 
were worth approximately sixty to seventy thousand dollars at the 
time the quit-claim deed was signed in 1967. Record at 359. The 
trial court stated the following regarding the value of the home: 
The Plaintiffs did not present evidence of value. 
And I know the Plaintiffs have a burden in that 
regard to prove unjust enrichment. That other houses 
in the area were selling in the fifties and sixties for 
very modest amounts. I cannot find that they are 
comparable sales because I don't have the information. 
But based upon all the information I have, and finding 
that the Defendants contributed between three and four 
thousand dollars at a time when both Defendants, sic 
Plaintiffs , who were in their late fifties, both 59 
years old, both have lived 39 years, my own experience 
is that people of that age have a life expectancy of 
twenty years or longer; three or four thousand dollars 
to buy a remainder interest in property valued at 
$15,000.00, the likelihood of realizing it twenty plus 
years down the road is not unjust. Record at 473. 
As the trial court stated in its decision, the Plaintiffs 
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did not put on evidence as to the exact value of the property. 
No appraisal was done. However, the trial court accepted the 
evidence introduced by the Plaintiffs establishing that there was 
sufficient equity in the property to establish that the 
Defendants would be unjustly enriched if allowed to keep the 
property subject to the quit-claim deed. The only estimate as to 
the approximate value of the property at the time the deed was 
signed was given by the Defendant Barbara Sheron, she stated that 
she believed the property to be worth approximately sixty or 
seventy thousand dollars in December of 1967. At the time of the 
trial the Plaintiffs did not attempt to establish the exact value 
of the house, only that there was sufficient equity in the house 
establish unjust enrichment. From the trial court's decision, it 
is clear that the Plaintiffs met their burden of proof. The 
trial court followed the standard set forth in Parks v. Zions 
First National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, (Utah 1983) where this Court 
held that where a substantial part of the marital estate was 
acquired from the husband's earnings, there was sufficient basis 
for holding that the Plaintiff had an equitable interest in the 
property. Under the Parks standard, it is not necessary to show 
actual value, only that there is an "equitable interest" 
sufficient to amount to an "unjust enrichment" of the Defendant. 
Regarding the evidence of money contributed to the 
construction of the home by the Defendants, the Defendants showed 
no receipts, or any record of any of their alleged contributions. 
Clearly, the evidence presented at the trial was insufficient to 
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establish that the Defendants contributed $lf900.00 plus $700.00 
prior to 1967. Because it is so easy to verify whether the 
Defendant took out a loan from Beneficial for $700.00 and to 
learn what the loan was used for, the issue of damages should be 
remanded to the trial court for more in depth consideration. 
The evidence which the Plaintiffs allege was not presented 
sufficiently was: 
a. The value of the property was never established. 
b. No receipts were provided by Defendants to substantiate 
any of the Defendant's claims regarding contributions to the 
construction of the home. 
c. No records were provided regarding the loan from 
Beneficial Finance that Arthur Sheron testified he took out for 
$700.00 which he stated he loaned to the Opheikens, and which the 
Opheikens testified he used to buy a car. 
CONCLUSION 
The primary reason the Opheikens brought this action was to 
retain the right to determine to whom their life earnings would 
pass at their death. At no time have the Sherons asked their 
parents to leave their home. From the time the quit-claim deed 
was signed in 1967, it has been understood that the Opheikens 
would live out their lives in the home. The Opheikens brought 
this action to retain the right to pass on their home to the 
heirs of their choice, not merely to live out their lives in the 
home. To deny the Opheikens the right to pass their home on to 
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the heirs of their choice, the court would remove any benefit a 
constructive trust would impose. In short, the trial court's 
remedy does not allow the Plaintiffs the option of paying back 
the Sherons and retaining their house, which is the only reason 
they petitioned the trial court to impose a constructive trust. 
ADDENDUM 
No addendum is attached because all references are to the 
Record. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of December, 1988. 
STEPHEN W. FARR G. SCOTT JENSEN 
Attorney for Appellant Attorney for Appellant 
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